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Historical learning in the design of WTO rules: the EC sugar case 
 
 
Abstract 
The Uruguay Round agreement saw significant changes made to the way in which 
international trade was governed. Trade rules and dispute settlement mechanisms 
were altered and a series of specific agreements provided for liberalisation across 
economic sectors. The Agreement on Agriculture, arguably the most difficult and 
contentious to negotiate, permitted the continued use of trade distorting instruments, 
both domestically and at the border. Rule-enforcement in agriculture therefore relies 
crucially on the clarity of the rules. This paper provides an in-depth study of a unique 
and critical case for understanding the new rules: the EC sugar regime. This policy 
was challenged unsuccessfully under the pre-Uruguay Round rules, but successfully 
under the new rules. The sugar case is particularly valuable as the policy was 
essentially unchanged and the challenges addressed the same concern – excessive 
export subsidisation. Drawing on primary and secondary materials and interviews 
with key policy actors, this case is used to illustrate how those involved in the 
multilateral process learned from particular rule weaknesses revealed in earlier cases, 
to revise those rules in the Uruguay Round in such a way that dispute panels can more 
readily and objectively determine rule breaches. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The European Communities’ (EC1) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
been reformed extensively since 1992, but until 2005 its sugar regime had remained 
fundamentally unaltered. A key catalyst for the timing and shape of this reform was a 
successful challenge in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by Australia, Brazil and 
Thailand, inducing significant reform in a sector previously resistant to change. What 
makes the EC sugar case both unusual and particularly information rich is that the 
regime also faced actions in 1978, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Given both the EC policy and complainants’ principal policy concern were 
essentially the same in both periods, sugar offers a unique opportunity for 
comparative historical analysis, allowing us to isolate as far as possible the influence 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) on agricultural trade dispute settlement.2 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine how, through the act of dispute 
settlement, weaknesses in trade rules manifested themselves, how those trade rules 
were changed and, as a result, how these changes have affected the ability of the 
WTO to make determinations in disputes, with the present paper paying particular 
attention to the rules pertaining to export subsidisation. The focus on agricultural 
products is also significant: in contrast to industrial goods, the WTO still permits such 
trade-distorting interventions in agricultural markets. The rules must therefore be 
capable of allowing breaches of the limits to such intervention to be determined. This 
                                                 
1 The World Trade Organisation (WTO), for legal reasons, uses the term European Communities rather 
than European Union. Since the primary policy focus of the present paper is the challenge to the EC 
sugar regime made in the WTO, the term EC is used throughout for simplicity. 
2 Chile twice brought actions against EC restrictions on apple imports, but both (in 1979 and 1988) 
were under pre-Uruguay Round rules. 
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paper, therefore, focuses on trade rules and trade policies, rather than the detailed 
mechanisms of dispute settlement (see, inter alia, Cameron and Campbell, 1998). 
 We present an in-depth case study of the challenges against the EC sugar 
regime based on analysis of primary and secondary documents and a series of 
interviews with key actors. Case study methods have enjoyed a recent revival in 
interest in qualitative research methodology as valid and useful tools for the analysis 
of complex causation in historical sequences, which include rare events and where 
there are strong interaction effects between variables (Flyvbjerg, 2001; George and 
Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Elman, 2006 and 2007). 
 Sugar is a critical case study for understanding the development of 
agricultural trading rules after the Uruguay Round (UR): as a single, powerful case it 
permits deductions to be made about the larger phenomenon of the international 
governance of agriculture in the WTO. Indeed, the fieldwork interviews reported in 
this paper reveal that the complainants viewed a successful challenge as being of 
strategic importance to the general issue of how trading rules work in agriculture post-
UR. The 2002 sugar case was thus an important early case which held the possibility, 
even if the WTO does not operate on a common law basis, of creating precedence 
effects and clarifying the meaning of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA).3 The two sugar actions from 1978 are also important for their rarity; the 
GATT was asked only on three other occasions to rule on Article XVI:3 and export 
subsidies (see below). One of these cases occurred very early in the history of the 
GATT, whilst the other two, coming immediately before the start of the Uruguay 
Round, had their Panel reports blocked by one or other of the Parties. 
                                                 
3 See Kireeva and O’Connor (2005) for an overview of this issue. 
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 We infer three important lessons from the case study that are of broader 
relevance to the international governance of agricultural trade. First, there are 
separable but linked institutional developments in the UR in the WTOs governance of 
agricultural trade liberalisation. The case study reveals complex and contingent inter-
temporal interactions and feedback between dispute outcomes, agreement on trade 
rules and trade liberalisation, and subsequent disputes. 
 Second, the UR does not mark the culmination of a process of legalisation in 
agricultural trade. In particular, the sugar case reveals the continued role of political 
bargaining, from the selection of the case by the complainants to negotiations over EC 
compliance with the decision. Third, the case casts light on the effect of institutional 
change on the strategies of WTO member states in trade liberalisation negotiations. 
This allows us, from a neo-institutionalist perspective, to adumbrate how WTO 
institutional change might shape trade liberalisation outcomes in the contemporary 
international governance of agricultural trade. 
 Section 2 analyses the basis for and timing of the 20024 action. Section 3 puts 
this into comparative historical context by examining the earlier sugar cases, isolating 
the elements of the URA crucial to understanding the different outcomes. Section 4 
teases out the critical elements of institutional change in the WTO for the 
contemporary international governance of agricultural trade. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
4 Australia and Brazil requested consultations in September 2002 (WTO, 2002a and 2002b). Thailand 
made its request in March 2003 (WTO, 2003a). Coordinated requests for the establishment of a Panel 
came in July 2003 (WTO 2003b; 2003c; and 2003d). This paper dates the start of the case (referred to 
in the singular) to the first formal contact with the WTO. Separate documents are available under each 
case number: 265 (Australia), 266 (Brazil) and 283 (Thailand). Except where indicated, full details will 
be given just for documents relating to case 265. 
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2. THE 2002 CHALLENGE TO THE EC SUGAR REGIME 
 a. Key Features of the EC Sugar Regime 
 The basis of EC support was high prices, but on output limited by quota. This 
was split into ‘A’ and ‘B’ quota and allocated to member states, who assigned it to 
individual producers. However, the total of A and B-quota contained an in-built 
surplus which, since 1974/75, has varied between about 1.5 and 4 million tonnes. An 
intervention price was set for white sugar, of which processors had to pass 58% to 
producers. A Basic Price was then derived for beet, with prices for A and B-quota 
beet production based on this. Production in excess of quota (‘C’ sugar) had to be 
exported and was not eligible for an export subsidy. 
 In terms of the politics of CAP reform, the sugar regime never had the 
budgetary impact of other commodities because, in 1981, a co-responsibility levy was 
imposed on producers to cover the cost of export subsidies. The levy has usually been 
2% of the intervention price on A-quota sugar, and a percentage on B-quota sugar that 
could rise as necessary, up to a ceiling (that changed over time) to cover the balance 
of subsidy costs. 
 A further dimension to the EC sugar regime resulted from the accession of the 
UK in 1973. It had, under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA), given 
preferential access to its (deficit) market to cane-based raw sugar from Australia and 
several developing countries. The CSA expired in 1974, but pressure from 
commonwealth countries and the principal refiner of the imported raw sugar, Tate and 
Lyle, saw the UK negotiate a deal granting the developing countries (but not 
Australia) preferential access to the EC market. Moreover, the EC guaranteed to buy 
the sugar at the intervention price. This formed the Sugar Protocol of the Lomé 
Convention in 1975, a trade agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
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group of developing countries. By then, however, the EC was self-sufficient so, ever 
since, an equivalent quantity of sugar has been sold back onto the world market with 
subsidy. These exports, as well as the imports, have been treated as a development 
policy, separated from other sugar transactions and budgetary costs. 
 
 b. The Basis and Timing of the Challenge 
 In late 2002 Australia and Brazil, joined in early 2003 by Thailand (henceforth 
ABT), began a joint action against the EC sugar regime. ABT are, along with the EC, 
the world’s largest sugar exporters. The WTO Panel found against the EC in October 
2004. Following an appeal by the EC, this decision was upheld in all significant 
respects by the Appellate Body (AB) in April 2005 (WTO 2004 and 2005). The EC 
agreed a reform of the sugar regime in November 2005, having published an outline 
reform package in July 2004 but draft legislation only in June 2005 (European 
Commission 2004 and 2005). 
 The essence of the case was simple: the EC was subsidising sugar exports in 
excess of the volume and expenditure limits set down in the Uruguay Round 
commitments. The excess had two distinct sources – C sugar exports and ACP-
equivalent exports – both of which the EC had excluded when establishing its 
commitments schedule. With C sugar, the ABT argument was that these exports were 
being cross-subsidised from the high support granted to A and B-quota sugar. The 
ACP-equivalent exports, in contrast, had always openly been subsidised. A finding 
against the EC would have profound implications: with no facility to re-negotiate 
export subsidy commitments ex post, the failure to include these quantities in the 
commitments ab initio would mean the EC could not simply reduce them by the 21% 
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agreed in the Uruguay Round – it would have to eliminate them totally or reduce 
domestic A and B-quota production by an equivalent amount. 
 The URA consists of multiple elements locked into a ‘Single Undertaking’. 
Thus the requests for consultation were based on alleged breaches of several Articles 
from different elements of the URA. From the AoA, Articles 3.3 and 8 require 
Members to respect the export subsidy quantity and expenditure limits specified in 
their schedules. Articles 9.1 and 10.1 then establish the subsidies subject to reduction 
under the export commitment – the latter doing so by reference to consequence rather 
than instrument. Australia also identified Article 11, subsidies paid on incorporated 
products. 
 Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreement were also called upon. These prohibit the use of subsidies awarded 
contingent on export performance, except as permitted under the AoA. ABT 
‘doubled-up’ with the AoA and SCM because, if successful, swifter compliance is 
possible under the SCM than AoA (“without delay” rather than within a “reasonable 
period of time” – the latter term being from Article 21 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)).5 ABT also referred to Article XVI of the GATT (subsidies); 
and Article III:4 (“national treatment”), given that some subsidies were available to 
processors only on sugar derived from EC-produced cane or beet. 
 Consultations were held with Australia and Brazil in November 2002 and with 
Thailand in April 2003. These failed to yield a satisfactory result so, in July 2003, 
ABT issued coordinated requests for a Panel to be established. These referred to the 
                                                 
5 The Panel chose not to consider the SCM issues, for reasons of ‘judicial economy’. The AB criticised 
the Panel for this, as it denied ABT a possible resolution, but the AB lacked the information to reach a 
decision themselves (WTO, 2005, pp. 113-118). 
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principal Articles of the AoA and SCM mentioned above, but no longer mentioned 
Articles III:4 and XVI of GATT 1994, nor Article 11 of the AoA. The net tends to be 
cast wide in consultations, as matters not covered there cannot then be introduced into 
panel requests. More significantly, a tactical decision was taken to focus the panel 
case on the central issue of export subsidies. Some of the other concerns would have 
been burdensome on the complainants and Panel for limited commercial reward. A 
successful challenge on export subsidies, however, would be sufficient to put pressure 
on the EC to reform its domestic support.6 
 Several factors explain the timing of the challenge. EC sugar exports had 
risen, rather than fallen, since the conclusion of the UR, with world prices falling as a 
result. The EC had even “boasted”7 in their documents about not having to make cuts. 
However, Article 9.2(b) of the AoA allowed for some shifting of subsidised exports 
between years during the “implementation period” 1995-2000, so it was only after 
this that definitive judgements could be made on subsidised export quantities and 
expenditures. A further factor was analytical. Cross-subsidisation was known about 
earlier (see, inter alia, BAE, 1985, pp. 199-201) but it had been assumed that C sugar 
could have come from the most efficient EC producers who were capable, at the 
margin, of producing and exporting profitably.8 It was only with more recent 
analytical developments (see Rose, 2004) that a rigorous basis for pursuing such a 
case emerged. 
 A third factor was the time taken to coordinate the challenge. There were 
strong cross-country contacts from the outset, with ABT all members of the Cairns 
                                                 
6 Correspondence with senior Australian government official, Canberra, 20 November 2007. 
7 Interview with senior Australian officials, Canberra, 30 October 2007. 
8 Interview with senior Australian officials, Canberra, 30 October 2007. 
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Group and the Global Sugar Alliance (GSA). The GSA, based in Australia, was 
launched at the Seattle WTO Ministerial in 1999 to pursue sugar trade liberalisation 
through the WTO, although initially it was envisaged that the multilateral talks 
expected to start in Seattle would be the principal channel for this.9 The Brazilian 
industry was the first to suggest that the EC policy could be vulnerable to a challenge, 
in response to which the Australian industry approached their government to consider 
the merits of a case. In the run-up to the action, however, key work was undertaken 
among senior diplomats.10 
 The domestic process behind the decision to pursue the sugar case was slightly 
different in each country. In Australia, the industry and government worked closely in 
preparing the case, as they were to do throughout, with the industry providing market 
information and technical assistance. Indeed Rose (2004), commissioned to assist the 
Australian government over the question of cross-subsidisation of C-sugar, draws on a 
report from an economic consultancy commissioned and funded by the Australian 
sugar industry for the purposes of this action. Australia were the first to be ready to go 
to the WTO: there was then a sense in Canberra that they were having to wait for the 
other countries to prepare. 
 In Brazil, the evolution was rather different.11 Again, there were close links 
between industry and government – indeed, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MRE)12 lacking a budget to pursue cases, finance had to come from the sugar 
industry. Crucial to the Brazilian approach is the role of the MRE in judging when an 
                                                 
9 Interview with senior Australian sugar industry official, Brisbane, 13 November 2007. 
10 Interview with senior Brazilian trade diplomat, 14 November 2007. 
11 Interview with senior Brazilian trade diplomat, 14 November 2007. 
12 Ministério das Ralações Exteriores. 
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“issue” becomes a “case” – something they have developed a strong reputation for 
given their success in the cases pursued. At this time, however, Brazil was also 
preparing a case against US cotton policy. It was a deliberate tactic that the requests 
for consultation should go in together. The concern was that if one case started first 
and suffered a setback, that would have implications for the credibility of the other, its 
individual merits notwithstanding. Thus Brazil, in effect, kept Australia waiting until 
it was ready to move on both cases. 
 An interesting aspect of the development of the Brazilian case was the role of 
Oxfam and their work on EC sugar policy. Oxfam (2002a) had recently been 
published and, through regular dialogue, Brazil was aware of, for example, the cross-
subsidisation of C-sugar (see also Oxfam 2002b and 2004). This was part of the case-
building in Brazil, a role Oxfam was also aware of.13 In Australia, the work of Oxfam 
did not have the same role in shaping the action, but it was still important for their 
case, being “of substance” and by a development agency. Australia made it clear 
throughout the case they were not challenging the preferential imports of the Sugar 
Protocol, but were concerned rather with EC exports, something that also affected 
developing countries and from whom Australia “got a lot of support” during the case. 
Indeed several developing countries joined the case, on both sides, as Third Parties. 
Oxfam (2002a) and (2004) were both submitted as exhibits during the investigation 
(WTO, 2004, pp. 201-202). 
 The outcome of an earlier action, brought by the US and New Zealand against 
Canadian dairy exports also helped clarify the sugar case. One issue this case dealt 
with was to confirm that an element of production, seen by ABT as fundamentally the 
same in policy terms as C-sugar, was being cross-subsidised on export by high 
                                                 
13 Interview with senior Oxfam Policy Advisor, Oxford, 14 August 2007. 
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support on other production – that is, such a policy structure did generate 
‘subsidisation’ consistent with the AoA and URA. 
 
 c. The EC Reform 
 The EC, as noted above, put forward a plan for reform of the sugar regime in 
2004, but it was only after the AB report that the legal texts were finalised and 
published. The key finding of the Panel and AB Reports was that all EC sugar exports 
were relevant for the export subsidisation commitments; 1.273 million tonnes of sugar 
and €499.1 million for the export subsidy costs. Having excluded C-sugar exports and 
ACP-equivalent exports from their export commitments, the EC was now faced with 
the prospect of having to reduce total sugar exports by 73% from their base levels 
(European Communities, 2004a, p. 67). 
 Furthermore the EC market would be faced with additional pressures in 
coming years. The ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) trade agreement would allow the 49 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to export sugar to the EC without barriers from 
2009. In addition, motivated in part by the need periodically to get a WTO waiver for 
the non-reciprocal Cotonou Agreement (the successor to Lomé), the EC is moving its 
trade agreements with the ACP to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) model 
of (reciprocal) bilateral free-trade areas, as used with other third countries. The key 
consequence of this change for the present paper is the abandonment of the Sugar 
Protocol. In its place participating ACP countries would, after a transition period 
(current negotiations suggest 2015), also have barrier-free access to the EC market – 
but at lower prices and without a guaranteed buyer. Thus all EBA and EPA imports 
would be on a commercial basis. 
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 Given these pressures, high internal prices could not be sustained. Such prices 
would draw in larger quantities of sugar from developing countries, require direct 
controls on C-sugar production and still need large cuts in domestic quota levels. 
Price cuts would reduce the incentives for C-sugar production internally and limit the 
soon-to-be unfettered developing country imports. The centre-piece of the reform 
was, therefore, a 36% cut in support prices, to be phased in over four years from 
2006/07. EC producers will be compensated about 64% of this cut through changes to 
Single Farm Payments. Limited compensation is also available to ACP producers, 
whose production and returns on sales to the EC will fall. 
 There is also a complex structure of incentives and compensation measures for 
quota retirement, funded via quota levies on those producers and processors who do 
not retire quota. This was intended as a voluntary scheme but, given the tight 
timeframe from agreement on reform (November 2005) to publication of the legal 
texts (February 2006), Article 44 was added to the legislation during this period to 
allow compulsory cuts to be imposed.14 The A and B-quota distinction has been 
removed whilst C-sugar, now called “out of quota sugar” no longer has to be 
exported. As less efficient producers leave the industry, 1 million tonnes of quota will 
be made available for more efficient producers to buy. A review is scheduled for 
2008, although changes had to be made to the compensation system in September 
2007, given the low initial rate of quota retirement. 
 
3. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE 2002 SUGAR CASE: 
GATT CHALLENGES 1978 AND 1982 
                                                 
14 Interview with senior sugar industry official, London, 9 August 2007. 
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 In 1978 as in 2002, a rapid increase in EC exports triggered actions by 
Australia and Brazil against the EC’s sugar regime (GATT, 1979, p. 30). The earlier 
actions were brought separately (GATT, 1978a and 1978b) but shared a key point: 
through the subsidisation of sugar exports, the EC had violated Article XVI:3 of the 
GATT, which states that when subsidies are used in the export of primary products, 
they ‘shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product’. In so doing, 
‘serious prejudice’ was caused or threatened to the interests of Australia and Brazil. 
 The Australian representative argued that the original intention of Article XVI 
had been “to include the concept of maintaining exports at a level higher than would 
otherwise exist in the absence of the subsidy” (GATT, 1979, p. 3; GATT, 1994, p. 
414).15 When a subsidy equivalent to $US403/tonne was offered with the London 
Daily white sugar price at $US206/tonne, “it was reasonable to suppose” (GATT 
1979, p. 4) EC export volumes were influenced by the subsidy awarded. 
 Panel reports were published in 1979 on Australia’s action (GATT, 1979) and 
1980 for Brazil’s action (GATT, 1980 – each report also summarising the discussion 
in and evolution of the cases). The Panel investigating Australia’s complaint observed 
that the EC sugar regime had no effective constraints on output, surpluses, entitlement 
to refunds nor amount of refunds granted. Although the increased EC share of world 
exports in 1976 and 1977 “was not unusual in magnitude” (GATT, 1979, p. 31), “[i]t 
was evident that the increase in exports [in 1978] was effected through the use of 
subsidies” (ibid). 
                                                 
15 Although this introduced a contradiction with Article XVI:3, which expressly allows for subsidies 
increasing imports, subject to the ‘equitable share’ condition. 
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 That said, the 1978 International Sugar Agreement (ISA) required member 
countries, including Australia and Brazil but not the EC, to reduce production and 
exports to try to stabilise global markets.16 In this context the Panel found “difficulties 
in establishing clearly the causal relationships between the increase in Community 
exports, the developments of Australian sugar exports and other developments in the 
world sugar market” (GATT, 1979, p. 32) and thus was forced to admit “that it was 
not in a position to reach a definite conclusion that these developments had resulted in 
the European Communities “having more than an equitable share of world export 
trade in that product”, in terms of Article XVI:3” (ibid). 
 Nevertheless, the EC export subsidy system had depressed world prices and 
thus “serious prejudice had been caused indirectly to Australia” (ibid), although the 
extent of this could not be quantified. Because of its open-ended subsidy 
arrangements, the EC system also “constituted a permanent source of uncertainty in 
world sugar markets” (ibid) and thus represented a threat of prejudice. Alleged 
violation of Article XXIII:1 (nullification and impairment of benefits from GATT) 
was not considered as “no detailed submission had been made” (ibid) detailing the 
benefits affected. 
 For Brazil, exports in 1976 and 1977 had, in general, been affected by outside 
factors, but not EC exports. On some specific markets where Brazilian and EC 
exports were in direct competition, there was no “clear and general evidence” (GATT, 
1980, p. 29) that displacement had occurred. Like Australia, however, Brazil had 
suffered serious prejudice. Regarding complaints under Articles XXXVI and 
XXXVIII (Trade and Development), subsidised EC exports occurred at a time when 
                                                 
16 Brisbane’s Courier Mail reported on 28 June 1979 that about 3 million tonnes of Australia’s cane 
crop that year was expected to be left in the fields, given over-production relative to ISA limits. 
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markets were depressed and developing countries were trying, through the ISA, to 
improve market conditions. The EC “had therefore not collaborated jointly with other 
contracting parties to further the principles and objectives set forth in Article XXXVI” 
(page 30). 
 The ruling against the EC over serious prejudice was regarded initially by 
Australia as a “huge”17 win as the source of the serious prejudice was clear: an EC 
export subsidy system that destabilised the world market and which had no effective 
limits on subsidised exports. Thus, soon after the Panel report on Brazil’s action was 
adopted a GATT Working Party was established for discussions between the parties, 
to explore possibilities for limiting subsidised EC exports (see GATT, 1981a). 
 The meetings of the Working Party in 1980 and 1981 were characterised by 
discussion over the merits of various limited EC ‘reforms’ – modest price rises, no 
quota increases and, from 1981, the producer co-responsibility levy. Neither Australia 
nor Brazil accepted the changes as a “meaningful” response to the call to reduce the 
quantities eligible for subsidy and to make firm commitments on support prices 
(GATT, 1981a, p. 5). The EC response was that there was no obligation under Article 
XVI:1 to do either. As for ACP-equivalent exports, the EC was still insisting they 
were separate from other subsidised exports; the Australian and Brazilian 
representatives continuing to reject this position. The Australians pointed out (GATT, 
1981b, p. 10-11) that virtually all ACP sugar imports were consumed within the UK. 
It was therefore producers in other EC countries that benefited from the ability to 
produce and export – with subsidy – the equivalent amount of sugar (see also GATT, 
1981e, p. 18). 
                                                 
17 Interview with senior Australian government official, Canberra, 30 October 2007. 
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 The Australian representative argued that failure to act on EC subsidies would 
mean the GATT would be admitting it “was unwilling to use its influence” to get 
contracting parties to change policies in order to fulfil their international obligations 
(GATT, 1981c, p. 14). The New Zealand representative on the Working Group added 
(page 16) that “this issue constituted the most important agricultural trade problem to 
come before the GATT since the conclusion of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
and that the Report of the Working Party recorded a disappointing lack of success of 
the dispute settlement system.” Australia submitted a draft decision to bring the issue 
to a close, but the EC would not accept it. 
 In September 1981, a second Working Party was established to monitor 
ongoing developments (see GATT, 1981e). The EC was now adamant that the shift to 
producer-funded exports meant they were now no longer subsidised within the 
meaning of the GATT (see, inter alia, GATT, 1981d, p. 19; 1982a, p. 4). This 
argument was based on the interpretative note to Article XVI included in Annex I of 
the Agreement. Subsidies, within the meaning of Article XVI:3, arise when “wholly 
or partly financed out of government funds in addition to the funds collected from 
producers in respect of the product concerned” (emphasis added). If EC payments 
were not subsidies, the charge of serious prejudice could not apply to the exports on 
which they were paid. By excluding ACP-equivalent sugar from the discussion, the 
EC was also avoiding having it aggregated with other sugar exports. Since the former 
was openly exported with subsidies, combining them would bring the latter within the 
meaning of the interpretative note (see, inter alia, GATT, 1982a, pp. 5-7). 
 Ultimately: “The Chairman [of the GATT Council] expressed regret that no 
satisfactory solution had been reached in this matter. The Council had adopted two 
Panel Reports; and a series of formal and informal meetings had been devoted to this 
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subject. However, the Council had not been able to arrive at a solution satisfactory to 
all. He suggested that these two cases be closed…….It was so decided” (GATT, 
1982c, p. 21, emphasis in original). Even where the Panels had found against the EC – 
on “serious prejudice” – there was not a formal objective way to determine if the EC 
actions taken had removed the threat of serious prejudice (notwithstanding the legal 
loophole of producer-funded subsidies). 
 Two days later the GATT received another request for consultation over the 
EC sugar regime (GATT, 1982b). This time it was a joint action by ten countries – 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, India, 
Nicaragua, Peru and the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter the GATT 10) – 
addressing the same elements of Article XVI as the previous actions. After EC 
prevarication, consultations were held in September 1982 which, like previous 
discussions, failed to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome (GATT, 1982d, p. 20-
21). 
 On this occasion, however, the GATT 10 did not request a Panel, but laid the 
action to one side. There had been “no real expectation we would be more 
successful”18 than previously; the motivation was more “one of hope” that the EC 
could be forced to negotiate terms of entry into a new ISA. The current ISA was 
struggling because, as noted earlier, EC exports were undermining the efforts of the 
members (including the GATT 10) to support sugar prices by limiting production and 
exports. As the 1982 case was intended as leverage, it was “unlikely” ever to go to 
                                                 
18 Interview with senior Australian government official, Canberra, 30 October 2007. 
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litigation.19 Furthermore, countries were devoting considerable time and effort to 
prepare for the November 1982 GATT Ministerial, regarded as the starting point of 
moves to establish a new GATT Round. From that meeting, “avoiding subsidization 
seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of contracting parties” (GATT, 1982e, p. 
9) was highlighted as an issue needed addressing. Attention thus turned to what would 
become the Uruguay Round talks.20 
 
4. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 
 The purpose of this section is to trace a link between the key policy issues that 
arose in the earlier sugar cases, institutional developments in the Uruguay Round and 
the policy issues from the 2002 sugar case.21 It is not suggested the changes agreed in 
the Uruguay Round were made exclusively as a result of the sugar cases described 
herein. It is argued, however, that the earlier sugar challenges stand as critical cases 
for some of the key shortcomings of the pre-Uruguay Round GATT that needed 
addressing. 
 Central to the sugar cases was the nature and definitions of export 
subsidisation. A key stumbling block for the 1978 actions was the meaning of “more 
                                                 
19 At the time Mr Doug Anthony, Deputy Prime Minister and Trade and Resources Minister, linked the 
case to the failure of the EC to discuss further the issue of serious prejudice caused by their export 
subsidies (Courier Mail, Brisbane, 6 April 1982). 
20 Also in April 1982, the US requested conciliation over the EC sugar regime. Their concerns were 
similar, although they also referred to the impact of EC subsidisation on domestic US prices. Like the 
GATT 10 action, however, this did not go far. See, inter alia, Josling and Tangermann, 2003, p. 219. 
21 For general accounts of the Uruguay Round see, inter alia, Anderson, 1996; Croome, 1999; Schott, 
1994; and Wiener, 1995. On agriculture see, inter alia, Davis, 2003; Josling et al., 1996; and Wolfe, 
1998. 
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than an equitable share of world export trade in that product”. It is not the intention of 
the present paper to discuss the possible interpretations of this ambiguous concept (the 
arguments used can be seen in the case documents, especially GATT, 1979 and 1980). 
We do note, however, that the EC and the complainants disagreed even about which 
notion of trade should be used as a base from which to determine “share”: much sugar 
trade was undertaken through long-term contracts and other special trading 
arrangements, thus “free” market trade represented a smaller base. The complainants 
argued for this, but the Panel agreed with the EC that “total” trade should be used. 
 The Uruguay Round outcome changed the debate fundamentally, by having 
countries agree schedules of export subsidisation commitments. By defining limits in 
terms of absolute values of quantity or budget expenditure, the ambiguity over the 
meaning of “equitable shares” became irrelevant. Indeed, Australia knew going into 
the Uruguay Round that it was vital to address the shortcomings of Article XVI.22 
What makes the concept of “equitable shares” so extraordinary can be seen from the 
earlier quote from GATT, 1979, p. 32, that despite considering all available evidence, 
the Panel “was not in a position to reach a definite conclusion” over whether the EC 
had attained “more than an equitable share of world export trade” in sugar. The key 
term in Article XVI:3 of the General Agreement was so problematic, the GATT Panel 
charged with interpreting it felt unable to do so. 
 Subsequently, the GATT Committee on Trade in Agriculture made the 
interesting comparison that “[l]ike beauty or pornography, determining what is an 
equitable share of world export trade in a primary product is a difficult matter and 
subject to the eye of the discriminating beholder” (GATT, 1983, p. 50). Indeed, of the 
five occasions when GATT Panels were called upon to do so, only on one occasion 
                                                 
22 Interviews with senior Australian government official, Canberra, 30/31 October 2007. 
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did they reach a decision, in a 1958 action brought by Australia against French 
exports of wheat and wheat flour (see GATT, 1958, p. 7; Delcros, 2002, pp. 224-225). 
In contrast to the sugar cases, with the other two cases that came after (US actions 
against EC exports of wheat flour and pasta – see Josling and Tangermann, 2003, pp. 
216-218 for summaries), both Panel Reports were blocked, one by the EC, the other 
by the US. 
 The Committee on Trade in Agriculture suggested the key issue was “that 
subsidies must not only be found to exist, but must be demonstrated to be the factor 
more important than any other factors taken together, that could account for the 
subsidizing country's increased share of world export trade” (GATT, 1983, p. 52). In 
the early case, the panel took a very simple view of this – one the parties accepted; the 
latter cases saw increasing recourse to debate over the terms of Article XVI:3, notably 
“special factors” affecting trade and “previous representative period”. 
 As Josling and Tangermann (2003, p. 214) point out, the record of actions in 
the GATT based on Article XVI “is of almost total failure to apply any judicial 
restraint or discipline to the export subsidies in use for farm products”. Croome (1999, 
p. 92) notes that, in preparing for the Uruguay Round, the Committee on Trade in 
Agriculture “aimed at establishing conditions “under which substantially all measures 
affecting agriculture will be brought under more operationally effective GATT rules 
and disciplines””. To the extent that GATT Panels could not meaningfully define 
what constituted equitable market shares, that particular rule was clearly not 
“operationally effective”. 
 Another ambiguity related to the nature of subsidies. According to Josling and 
Tangermann (2003, p. 214), “[t]he issue of what constituted a subsidy was not 
seriously in doubt” – what caused the problem was the lack of clarity in Article XVI 
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on their use with primary products. In the sugar cases, the arguments over subsidy-
type payments funded fully by producer payments revealed legal, if not policy, doubts 
over what was a subsidy and a loophole in the interpretative notes to the GATT: who 
funds the subsidy does not affect the impact of the exports on world markets and, 
thus, on other exporters. 
 Article 9 of the AoA now sets out a series of subsidies covered by the 
commitment. Paragraph (c) identifies “payments on the export of an agricultural 
product that are financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge on 
the public account is involved, including payments that are financed from the 
proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product concerned”. Thus fully 
producer-funded payments are now unambiguously ‘subsidies’. It should also be 
noted that disputes even arose over the meaning of ‘primary’ products. This was 
addressed in the AoA by the inclusion, in Annex 1, of a list of exactly which 
commodities and products it covers. 
 The commitment schedules also had a fundamental impact on the question of 
ACP-equivalent sugar exports in the 2002 action. In presenting their export 
commitments, the EC refer to “ACP/India equivalent” sugar in a footnote, where they 
indicate the commitment entered into “does not include exports of sugar of ACP and 
Indian origin on which the Community is not making any reduction commitments”. 
The EC claimed unsuccessfully in the WTO that on the basis of accepted practice in 
interpreting international law, the footnote is part of the commitment schedule 
(despite their failure to reduce exports of the relevant quantities up to that point). Both 
Panel and AB Reports agreed that the quantity referred to in Footnote 1 was outside 
the quantity committed for reduction and therefore had to be eliminated totally – a 
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policy decision made clearer by the use of explicit quantitative commitments as a 
framework for policy implementation. 
 On the specific quantities being subsidised, it was noted earlier that as the case 
progressed, it was helped in the matter of the cross-subsidisation of C-sugar by the 
action brought against the Canadian dairy regime. It is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to explore the underlying economics of the argument (see, in particular, 
Rose, 2004), but it is important to note that, under Article 10:3 of the AoA, it is now 
the duty of the defendant facing a claim of excessive subsidisation to show that 
quantities above the ceiling are NOT exported with subsidy, something the EC failed 
to do. Also, one particular aspect of the EC response to the question of C sugar is 
worth noting. From their first written and oral statements to the WTO, made on 11 
and 30 March 2004 respectively (European Communities, 2004a and 2004b), they 
argued (unsuccessfully) that the omission of C sugar from their commitment was an 
“excusable scheduling error” and that the complainants were not acting in “good 
faith” (Article 3:10 of the DSU) by seeking to get the EC, in effect, to eliminate C 
sugar exports entirely. 
 In terms of the history of sugar policy, however, it is hard to accept the notion 
of excusable errors given that the issue and status of C sugar had arisen in the 1978 
cases. Moreover, in their first oral statement (Australian Government, 2004), the 
Australians pointed out that their Minister for Trade wrote to the Agriculture 
Commissioner in December 1993 “recording Australia’s expectation that the EU [sic] 
Schedule of export subsidy reduction commitments should include commitments on 
all EC export sugar subsidies on sugar” (paragraph 21). They also pointed out 
(paragraph 26) that even in 1973 the “Commission had identified a problem with ‘C’ 
sugar”. 
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 One part of the earlier cases that was successful was the determination of 
“serious prejudice” against the complainants. As noted earlier, however, the feeling of 
the Australians that this win was “huge” was tempered by the knowledge that even 
this term is ambiguous: by how much must subsidised exports from one country be 
reduced in order to remove the actual or threatened “serious prejudice”? Thus the 
meaning of this term is linked intimately with the meaning of “equitable share”. The 
AoA, therefore, has expunged “serious prejudice” also (as has the DSU). On the other 
hand a breach of a country’s export commitment, an objective and quantified metric, 
constitutes a “prima facie….case of nullification or impairment” of a country’s 
expected benefits from WTO membership (DSU, Article 3.8). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 The WTO consists of several elements that are separable, but whose operation 
is inter-linked. The purpose of this paper has been, through the use of case-study 
methods, to explore the links between trade disputes and changes to trade rules. This 
has been done with reference to a series of challenges to the EC sugar regime – by 
Australia and Brazil in 1978 and by Australia, Brazil and Thailand in 2002. Both 
challenges focused, in particular, on the ‘excessive’ use of export subsidisation. 
 EC sugar offers a unique example of a policy, largely the same on both 
occasions, being challenged under two different sets of rules, before and after the 
Uruguay Round. Because this particular case study allows for connections to be made 
across time, shortcomings in the pre-Uruguay Round trade rules can be identified and 
specific rule-changes highlighted. The analysis has explored how the way in which 
the trading rules were expressed affected fundamentally the ability of the 
GATT/WTO to rule on the acceptability or otherwise of the subsidisation. 
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 It is not being claimed that the rule-changes occurred because of the sugar 
cases. It is argued, however, that the sugar cases – two of only five in the history of 
the GATT that made explicit reference to Article XVI:3 and the export subsidisation 
of primary products – brought specific weaknesses in the rules to the attention of 
policy makers in the countries concerned. As a result, multiple weaknesses seen in the 
pre-Uruguay Round rules through the sugar cases, were addressed in the Uruguay 
Round. Problems faced in those earlier cases led to lessons being learned in the re-
writing of trading rules – rules that, through the informal application of case law, 
continue to be developed and enhanced. 
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